Journal of Economic Literature
Coverage: 1969-2015 (Vol. 7, No. 1 - Vol. 53, No. 4)
The "moving wall" represents the time period between the last issue available in JSTOR and the most recently published issue of a journal. Moving walls are generally represented in years. In rare instances, a publisher has elected to have a "zero" moving wall, so their current issues are available in JSTOR shortly after publication.
Note: In calculating the moving wall, the current year is not counted.
For example, if the current year is 2008 and a journal has a 5 year moving wall, articles from the year 2002 are available.
- Terms Related to the Moving Wall
- Fixed walls: Journals with no new volumes being added to the archive.
- Absorbed: Journals that are combined with another title.
- Complete: Journals that are no longer published or that have been combined with another title.
Subjects: Business & Economics, Business, Economics
Collections: Arts & Sciences I Collection, Business & Economics Collection, Business I Collection, JSTOR Essential Collection
Blanchenay, Patrick (2013) Essays in applied microeconomics. PhD thesis, The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE).
This thesis addresses three questions using the same tool of microeconomic modelling. In the first chapter (joint with Emily Farchy), I examine the role of individual’s decision to acquire broad versus specialist knowledge. I show that a worker can afford to become more specialized on a narrower set of skills by relying on other workers for missing skills. This yields a new explanation of the urban wage premium, and in particular of why workers tend to be more productive in bigger cities, where the existence of better networks of workers provides more incentives to acquire specialized skills. This conclusion matches well established empirical findings on workers’ productivity in the literature. In the second chapter, I look at the dynamics of human capital acquisition over time and show the possibility of what I term a social poverty trap. Namely, parents who do not instil in their offspring the culture of social cooperation (modeled as a higher discount rate) deny them the possibility of future good outcomes; in turn, this new generation will be unable to invest resources in the socialization of their offspring, and so on. This creates a poverty trap where some dynasties are stuck in a bad equilibrium. In the last chapter, I model political parties campaigning on different issues to voters with limited attention. I assume that the relative salience of the different issues depend on how much time parties devote to each issue. In this setting, I show that campaigning might result in excessive focus on divisive issues (for political differentiation) to the detriment of Pareto-improving ones.
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